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Fact–value distinction
The fact-value distinction is a distinction between what ''is'' (can be discovered by science, philosophy, or reason) and what ''ought'' to be (a judgment agreed to by consensus, or believed to be objectively morally binding). The terms positive and normative represent another way to express this, as do the terms ''descriptive'' and ''prescriptive'', respectively. Positive statements make the implicit claim to facts (e.g., water molecules are made of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom), whereas normative statements make a claim based on values or norms (e.g., water ought to be protected from pollution).
==David Hume's skepticism==
The fact-value distinction emerged in philosophy in the Enlightenment. In particular, David Hume (1711–1776) argued that human beings are unable to ground normative arguments in positive arguments, that is, to derive ''ought'' from ''is''. Hume was a skeptic, and although he was a complex and dedicated philosopher, he shared a political viewpoint with previous Enlightenment philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and John Locke (1632–1704). Specifically, Hume, at least to some extent, argued that religious and national hostilities that divided European society were based on unfounded beliefs. In effect, he argued they are not found in nature, but are a creation of a particular time and place, and thus unworthy of mortal conflict. Thus Hume is often cited as the philosopher who finally debunked the idea of nature as a standard for political existence. For instance, without Hume, Jean Jacques Rousseau's (1712–1778) "return" to nature would have not been possible.
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